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INTRODUCTION
Everyday while working as a writers’ assistant for the popular
television sitcom “Friends,” Amaani Lyle witnessed the show’s writers
continuously make sex-related jokes, discuss blow job stories,
reference the actresses’ sexuality, write sex-related words on scripts,
and pantomime masturbation.1 After four months of transcribing
story line discussions, the supervising writers fired Lyle for her poor
typing skills and for her failure to accurately record important jokes
and dialogue in her notes.2
Following her dismissal, Lyle sued the individuals and organizations
involved in producing “Friends” under California’s Fair Employment
and Housing Act based on race and gender harassment.3 The Los
Angeles County Superior Court dismissed Lyle’s complaint as
frivolous.4 The Court of Appeal of California for the Second District
reversed and remanded in part, holding that the case presented
triable issues of fact regarding sexual harassment.5 Although the
Court of Appeal concluded that the trier of fact could find that the
writers’ room on “Friends” constituted a hostile work environment,6 it
also instructed that the trier of fact could consider the nature of the
defendants’ work in determining if their conduct amounted to a
hostile work environment.7 By co-opting the defendants’ argument
1. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 516 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (describing further
the defendants’ habits of drawing enlarged genitalia on cheerleaders’ bodies in a
pornographic coloring book in Lyle’s presence); Appellant’s Answer Brief on the
Merits at 20, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. filed Nov. 19,
2004) (No. S125271), 2004 WL 3256430 [hereinafter Appellant’s Answer Brief]
(recounting that the defendants openly and indiscriminately discussed Courtney
Cox’s fertility, commenting that her “pussy was full of dried up twigs” and that “if her
husband put his dick in her she’d break in two”).
2. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513 (asserting that because the writers fired Lyle
for her poor typing skills and failure to accurately record notes, they terminated her
employment based on nondiscriminatory factors).
3. See id. (noting that Lyle’s first complaint alleged that the defendants
terminated her in retaliation for regularly complaining that the show had no black
characters, but later amended her complaint to allege racial and sexual harassment).
4. See id. (recounting that the lower court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment because Lyle could not establish that the defendants terminated
her on the basis of race or sex discrimination).
5. See id. at 515 (citing Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842,
853 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)) (stating that an employee subjected to a hostile work
environment is a victim even though coworkers or supervisors do not direct offensive
remarks at the employee).
6. See id. at 517 n.59 (concluding that Lyle provided sufficient evidence to make
a prima facie case of sexual harassment because the record showed that the
defendants constantly engaged in crude and vulgar discussions about anal and oral
sex using the words “fuck,” “blow job,” and “schlong”).
7. See id. at 518 (acknowledging the defendants’ argument that vulgar, crude,
and disparaging language does not always support liability in the context of a creative
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and creating the creative necessity defense, the Court of Appeal
allowed for the “Friends” writers to avoid hostile work environment
liability if they could prove that discussing sexual exploits, making
lewd gestures, and displaying crude pictures denigrating women fell
within the scope of necessary job performance.8
This Note argues that the California Court of Appeal incorrectly
formulated the creative necessity defense because it is both
inconsistent with the legislative intent of federal and state antidiscrimination laws and unnecessary given the Supreme Court’s
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. Part II of this
Note traces the development of the hostile work environment sexual
harassment doctrine9 and provides a detailed summary of Lyle v.
Warner Brothers Television Productions.10 Part III argues that the
creative
necessity
defense
undermines
anti-discrimination
principles.11 Part IV discusses the implications of the creative necessity
defense for employers and employees in television production and
offers recommendations for the Supreme Court of California.12 Part
V concludes that courts should not recognize the creative necessity
defense in sexual harassment cases.13
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Doctrine
Evolved from Judicial Interpretation of Title VII
1. The Beginning: Title VII and Its Failure to Define Discrimination
Based on Sex
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the centerpiece of federal
environment when the writers acted within the capacity of their job by generating
ideas for an adult-oriented situation comedy).
8. See id. at 520 (analogizing the creative necessity defense to the business
necessity defense to disparate impact discrimination, and allowing the defendants to
convince a jury that the creative process for producing “Friends” required conduct
that is considered harassment in other contexts).
9. See infra Part II (discussing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the defenses to discrimination).
10. See infra Part II.D (detailing the conduct Lyle faced while working at Warner
Brothers, as well as outlining the case’s procedural history).
11. See infra Part III (explaining that the creative necessity defense is
inappropriate in sexual harassment cases because it is modeled after a disparate
impact defense).
12. See infra Part IV (recommending that the Supreme Court of California follow
Oncale’s totality of the circumstances test, which includes a consideration of social
context).
13. See infra Part V (concluding that the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity
defense is an unsound legal invention).
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legislation aimed at eliminating workplace discrimination.14
However, at its passage, Title VII did not define sexual harassment as
discrimination, nor did its legislative history offer guidance as to
whether sexual harassment was a form of discrimination.15 The
statute only made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against
any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 16 Consequently, the
courts struggled to determine what constituted actionable sex
discrimination.17
Despite Title VII’s ambiguity and the lack of legislative guidance
regarding the definition of discrimination, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first recognized that a hostile work
environment could constitute actionable discrimination in Rogers v.
EEOC.18 The Rogers court reasoned that Title VII prohibited
discriminatory working environments that could destroy the
emotional and psychological stability of minority employees; thus,
statutory protection extended beyond economic or tangible
discrimination.19
Further clarifying the definition of discrimination, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)20 issued guidelines
declaring hostile work environment sexual harassment a violation of
Title VII.21
Although no court had considered hostile work
14. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that
Congress’ objective in passing Title VII was to remove artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when they operate to invidiously discriminate on
the basis of impermissible classifications); Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
386 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the legislature designed the statute to provide equal
access to jobs for both men and women as evidenced by the plain language of Title
VII).
15. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (failing specifically to
define sex discrimination).
16. See id.
17. Compare Tompkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556
(D.N.J. 1976) (holding that sexual harassment and sexually motivated assault do not
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII), with Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654, 663 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding that sexual harassment constituted discriminatory
treatment under Title VII).
18. See 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (interpreting Title VII as an expansive
concept that proscribed the practice of creating work environments heavily charged
with racial or ethnic discrimination).
19. See id. (interpreting Title VII’s phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” as evincing a congressional intention to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (granting the EEOC authority to ensure compliance
with the federal civil rights laws guaranteeing nondiscriminatory employment).
21. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§
1604.11(a)-(f)(2005) (responding to the courts’ struggle to find hostile work
environment sexual harassment an actionable claim, the EEOC embraced the Rogers
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environment sexual harassment an actionable claim under Title VII,22
the EEOC guidelines recognized that unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other sexually-driven verbal and
physical conduct constituted employee harassment, even if it did not
affect the employee’s economic benefits.23 These guidelines, while
not controlling upon the courts, served as a “body of experience and
informed judgment” that the courts could consult in sexual
harassment cases.24
2. The Expansion: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Title VII
and the Hostile Work Environment Doctrine
Relying on the Rogers precedent and the EEOC Guidelines, the
Supreme Court made it clear that hostile work environment sexual
harassment violated Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.25
Mechelle Vinson worked as a bank teller and manager when her
supervisor subjected her to unwelcome public fondling, repeated
demands for sexual favors, and forcible rape.26 The Court ruled that
Title VII did not require Vinson to suffer an economic or tangible
detriment in order to establish a discriminatory environment; a
hostile or abusive work environment was enough.27 Meritor limited
the scope of Title VII by recognizing that not all harassing conduct

principle in its adopted guidelines).
22. See Susan Collins, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems: A Modest Clarification of
the Inquiry in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV.
1515, 1518 (stating that courts viewed hostile work environment sexual harassment
cases as a natural consequence of personality quirks and male-female interaction and,
consequently, did not recognize them); David M. Jaffe, Note, Walking the
Constitutional Tightrope: Balancing Title VII Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims with Free Speech Defenses, 80 MINN. L. REV. 979, 991 (1996)
(noting that before the 1980s, most sex discrimination claims only involved quid pro
quo harassment, the demand for sexual favors in exchange for economic or tangible
job benefits).
23. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)-(f)(providing that sexual harassment, which
unreasonably interferes with an individual’s work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, violates Title VII).
24. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)) (announcing that the EEOC guidelines
support the finding that harassment causing non-economic injury constitutes
actionable discrimination).
25. See id. at 73 (holding that a claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII when a plaintiff suffers unwelcome sexual
conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive).
26. See id. at 60 (acknowledging that Vinson’s toleration of sexual intercourse
forty to fifty times, indecent exposure, and forcible rape as a condition of her
employment created a hostile working environment).
27. See id. at 64 (explaining that the language of Title VII is not limited to sexual
harassment resulting in economic discrimination because Congress intended to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment).
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affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.28 The
Court affirmed that the sexual harassment must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create a hostile work environment for the complainant to have a
cause of action.29 However, the Court failed to provide a clear
definition of what satisfied this “severe or pervasive” threshold of
harm requirement.30
The Supreme Court clarified the degree of harm required for an
employee to have a viable hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.31 Teresa Harris
sued her employer for an abusive work environment, citing her
supervisor’s conduct of calling her a “dumb ass woman” in front of
customers, making sexual innuendos about her clothing, and asking
her to remove items from his front pocket.32 The Supreme Court
unanimously held that Harris did not have to suffer psychological
injury or adverse impact to make a prima facie showing that her
supervisor’s harassing conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive, so
long as a reasonable person would find the environment hostile and
that she actually perceived it as abusive.33 In enunciating this
objective-subjective component of the Meritor hostile work
environment standard, the Supreme Court stated that an “all the
circumstances” analysis is necessary to determine whether an

28. See id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971))
(announcing that the “mere utterance” of words that offend an employee would not
alter the conditions of employment and, therefore, would not violate Title VII).
29. See id. at 66 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)) (laying the foundation for the threshold a plaintiff must meet to make a prima
facie showing of hostile work environment sexual harassment).
30. See Susan Deller Ross, Workplace Harassment, in SPEECH & EQUALITY: DO WE
REALLY HAVE TO CHOOSE? 104 (Gara LaMarche ed., 1996) (remarking that Meritor
did not resolve the controversy surrounding hostile work environment harassment
because many courts still thought that a hypersensitive woman would build a case
over mere words). Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986) (requiring serious effects on employee’s psychological well-being), with Ellison
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Rabidue and stating that
employees need not endure sexual harassment until it seriously affects their
psychological well-being to bring a hostile work environment claim).
31. See 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (resolving a circuit split on whether conduct must
cause serious psychological injury to be actionable as hostile work environment sexual
harassment and finding that a plaintiff need not suffer psychological harm).
32. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (illuminating that the
test for determining if harassing conduct violates Title VII is whether employers
expose members of one sex to disadvantageous conditions of employment that
members of the opposite sex are not exposed to, and whether the harassment
interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance).
33. See id. at 21 (announcing a hostile work environment standard that struck a
balance between punishing conduct that is merely offensive and conduct that causes
tangible psychological injury).
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environment would reasonably be perceived as hostile.34
Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to elaborate upon the Meritor
hostile work environment standard in Harris, critics faulted the
decision for its vague totality of the circumstances test.35 In Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court refined the
test by instructing courts to consider the social context of the
workplace when deciding sexual harassment cases.36 Joseph Oncale
sued his employer for hostile work environment sexual harassment
under Title VII after working on an oil platform where his male
coworkers derided him for his alleged homosexuality, threatened
rape, and physically assaulted him.37 Although the lower courts
found that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title VII,
the Supreme Court concluded that the statute protects both men and
women.38 Cautious not to transform Title VII into a federal civility
code, the Court reiterated that the statute does not proscribe all
verbal and physical harassment with sexual connotations.39
Moreover, the Court emphasized that considering the workplace
context when determining whether the harassment met the threshold
requirement would prevent the possibility of imposing liability on
such social behavior as flirtation and horseplay.40 The Supreme
Court elaborated that the critical issue in hostile work environment
cases is whether employees of one sex are unilaterally exposed to

34. See id. at 23 (attempting to provide guidance on the totality of the
circumstances test and suggesting that it may include: (1) the frequency and severity
of the conduct; (2) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and (3) whether the conduct interferes with the employee’s
work performance). But see id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the list of
factors does little to clarify the vague hostile standard because it does not say how
much of each element is necessary or identify any single factor as determinative).
35. See Collins, supra note 22, at 1537 (commenting that the Court could have
proposed more specific requirements for its all the circumstances test, which would
have made the test more circumscribed, limited consideration of improper
stereotypes, and made the outcomes of hostile work environment cases more
consistent).
36. See 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (finding that a totality of the circumstances inquiry
requires consideration of the social context where the target experiences the
harassing behavior so courts can distinguish between simple teasing and harassment).
37. See id. at 77 (detailing that Oncale’s supervisor failed to remedy the harassing
and humiliating actions perpetrated by his coworkers, which forced Oncale to quit his
job for fear of being raped and file suit).
38. See id. at 78-79 (holding that nothing in Title VII’s text or legislative history
bars a claim of discrimination because the plaintiff and defendant are of the same
sex).
39. See id. at 81 (arguing that conduct that a reasonable person would not find
hostile or abusive is beyond the scope of Title VII).
40. See id. (illustrating that an analysis of social context would allow courts to
differentiate between a football coach smacking his player on the buttocks and
smacking his office secretary on the buttocks).
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disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment.41
B. California’s Sexual Harassment Law Parallels Title VII and Federal
Precedent
Section 12940 of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”), echoes the language of Title VII, making it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment on the basis of sex.42 For hostile work environment
sexual harassment to be actionable under section 12940 of FEHA, the
harassment similarly must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.43
However, unlike Title VII, section 12490 explicitly recognizes
hostile work environment harassment as unlawful discrimination.44
FEHA also expressly defines harassment to include verbal, physical,
and visual expressions or conduct.45
C. The Two Theories of Discrimination Under Title VII and FEHA
Title VII and FEHA recognize two theories of actionable
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.46 Disparate
treatment is intentional discrimination that occurs when an employer
treats one group less favorably than another group on account of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.47 Title VII and
41. See id. at 81 (reading the statute as forbidding behavior so objectively
offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment, but not interpreting it
to mean that workplaces demand asexuality or androgyny).
42. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) (West 2005) (exemplifying that state
legislatures consult federal decisions when drafting statutes that are synonymous in
purpose).
43. See Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 550 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998)(stating that, although the wording of Title VII differs in some particulars from
FEHA, the anti-discriminatory objectives and overriding public policy of the two acts
are identical).
44. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(1) (stating that the plaintiff does not have to
lose tangible job benefits to establish harassment).
45. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (West 2005) (providing a broader reading
of harassment than Title VII by stating that actionable harassment under FEHA can
include derogatory comments, physical interference with normal work, and
derogatory drawings).
46. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
713 n.1 (1983) (stating that the Court consistently distinguishes disparate treatment
cases from cases involving neutral employment standards that have a disparate impact
on minority applicants).
47. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (declaring that disparate treatment, as the most easily understood type of
discrimination, was the evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII); see also
Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should NonTargeted Workplace Conduct be Actionable Under Title VII?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1152,

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006

9

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3

120

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 15:1

FEHA recognize sexual harassment as conduct that is discriminatory
under a disparate treatment theory.48 Contrastingly, disparate impact
discrimination results when an employer’s facially neutral
employment practice disproportionately harms members of a
protected class and lacks a business justification.49
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory in
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, holding that Title VII prohibited
both overt discrimination and facially neutral employment practices
that were discriminatory in operation and unrelated to business
necessity.50 This ruling established the business necessity defense to
disparate impact discrimination, which Congress later codified as part
of the amended Title VII via the Civil Rights Act of 1991.51
Under the business necessity defense, courts will find otherwise
unlawful employment practices legal, as long as less discriminatory
alternatives are proven to be unavailable.52 Accordingly, an employer
will not be held liable for disparate impact discrimination if it can
prove that the challenged practice justifiably serves a legitimate
business purpose.53
The business necessity exception to Title VII and FEHA is defined
in terms of job relatedness.54 The majority of disparate impact cases
have applied the business necessity defense to challenges involving
employment practices for hiring, assignments, promotion, transfers,
1154 (2003) (illustrating that the classic sexual harassment pattern involves a male
supervisor propositioning a female subordinate for sex in exchange for retaining her
employment, a demand he would likely not make of a male employee).
48. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that sexual harassment is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate
treatment on an employee with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment).
49. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (explaining that the
plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that the facially neutral hiring practice selects
applicants in a significantly discriminatory pattern and that, once the prima facie case
of discrimination is established, the employer must meet the burden of showing that
the challenged practice bears a manifest relationship to employment).
50. See 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (ruling that employers cannot maintain facially
neutral employment practices if they freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory
practices).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2(k)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (establishing that an employer
can rebut a disparate impact claim by showing that a challenged employment practice
is a business necessity).
52. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.7(b) (West 2005) (echoing Griggs and its
progeny by codifying the business necessity defense to employment discrimination,
which allows employers to avoid liability if there is not an alternative practice with a
lesser discriminatory impact).
53. See id. (requiring that the practice serve the safe and efficient operation of
the business, as well as fulfill the employer’s said business purpose).
54. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 436 (defining business necessity as related to
job performance, having a manifest relationship to the employment in question, and
measuring the person’s suitability for the job and not the person in the abstract).
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and termination.55 However, courts have never recognized it as a
defense to disparate treatment cases affecting conditions of
employment.56
D. The Facts and History of Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television
Productions
1. Statement of the Case
Lyle was hired as a writers’ assistant for “Friends” in June 1999.57
She worked directly for Defendants Adam Chase, Greg Malins, and
Andrew Reich taking notes in the writers’ room and compiling
potential jokes and dialogue.58 During the interview, the writers
informed Lyle that they discussed sex and told lewd jokes during the
creative process.59
Lyle responded that she had worked at
Nickelodeon where writers’ discussion often turned racy.60
While employed as a writer’s assistant, Lyle spent fifty to seventy-five
percent of her time working in the writers’ room.61 According to Lyle,
the creative sessions included yelling, throwing things at the ceiling,

55. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (finding that an
employer’s written promotion examination acted as a non-job related barrier and
disparately impacted employees on account of their race in violation of Title VII);
Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 844 P.2d 389, 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a
bank’s good-faith belief that the employee’s accent would interfere with job
performance was not a defense to national origin discrimination when conferring
promotions).
56. See Timmons, supra note 47, at 1190 (offering that the limited use of the
disparate impact theory in conditions of employment cases is based on the language
of Title VII prior to its amendment by the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Teal, 457
U.S. at 448 (stating that disparate impact arises from the language of section
703(a)(2) of Title VII); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 (citing only section 703(a)(2) of
Title VII).
57. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 513 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (establishing the
date Lyle began to work directly under Chase and Malins).
58. See id. (noting that the most important duty of a writers’ assistant was to type
quickly to pick out ideas for future scripts). However, the defendants did not test
Lyle’s typing speed before hiring her. Id.
59. See Respondent’s Opening Brief on the Merits at 13, Lyle v. Warner Bros.
Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. filed Sept. 17, 2004) (No. S125271), 2004 WL
2823287 [hereinafter Respondent’s Opening Brief] (claiming that Lyle said she was
not a “babe in the woods” and understood that she would encounter sexual conduct
during the production of “Friends”).
60. See id. at 13 n.3 (acknowledging Lyle’s familiarity with working on a situation
comedy because she previously worked as a writers’ assistant on “Dream On,” where
she heard frank sexual discussion and saw nudity during her tenure). But see
Appellant’s Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 12 (asserting that Warner Brothers never
warned Lyle that writers would subject her to discussions about their own sexual
conduct).
61. See Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 13 (explaining that the
very nature of Lyle’s job required exposure to themes with sexual content).
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and sexually explicit conduct.62 Lyle witnessed the defendants
regularly refer to women as “cunts,” share their dating preference for
blondes with certain cup sizes, and discuss blow jobs.63 Defendant
Chase explained that, although these brainstorming sessions would
become “silly” and continue in the common areas, the discussions
would lead to interesting story lines and jokes.64
After four months, the defendants terminated Lyle for poor job
performance.65 During her exit interview, Lyle complained that her
supervisors discriminated against her because of her gender and
race.66 Shortly after her termination, Lyle filed complaints with the
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”),
stating that the writers fired her because of her sex, race, and
ancestry.67 Lyle did not assert that she had been harassed during her
employment at “Friends” until she amended her complaint
approximately one year later.68
2. Procedural History
Lyle’s first amended complaint alleged that the defendants’
employment practices violated FEHA and public policy because
Warner Brothers terminated her due to her opposition to “Friends”
62. See id. at 16 (describing the writers’ room as a locker room because the
defendants were “pimply-faced teenagers” and “silly little boys” who engaged in
“juvenile, counterproductive behavior”).
63. See Brief for Legal Aid Society-Employment Center et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 2,3, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal.
2004) (No. S125271), 2005 WL 847604 [hereinafter Brief for Legal Aid](stating that
producer Marta Kauffman did not permit the use of the word “cunt” in her presence
because she found it offensive, thus providing the defendants notice of the
abusiveness of this term). However, the defendants continued to use the words
“cunt,” “tits,” “pussy,” and “twat” when Kauffman was not present. Id.
64. See id. at 8 (emphasizing that the defendants engaged in conduct outside the
writers’ room that consisted of calendar defacement, pornographic drawings, and
loud sexist and racist speech). Lyle argued that these offensive discussions in the
hallway were not a part of the creative process of the writers’ room. Id.
65. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8-9, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod.,
Cal. App. 4th 1164 (2004) (No. B160528), 2003 WL 23153558 (arguing that the
reason given for Lyle’s termination was a pretext for retaliating against her for
criticizing the show’s discriminatory hiring practices toward black actors).
Defendants never put Lyle on notice that she was in jeopardy of losing her job, nor
did they alert her to any deficiencies in her work. Id.
66. See Appellant’s Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 15 (admitting that the human
resources manager did not believe Lyle’s complaints warranted an investigation
despite Warner Brothers’ policy requiring an investigation following sexual and racial
discrimination claims).
67. See Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 16 (arguing that the
defendants’ reason for terminating Lyle was a pretext for discrimination because they
did not terminate other writers’ assistants who were slow typists).
68. See id. (suggesting that Lyle was not harassed because she was not touched,
propositioned, threatened, demeaned, or the subject of any offensive statements in
the writers’ room).
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discriminatory hiring practices, her race, and her sex.69 The trial
court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and
attorney fees in the amount of $415,800.70 On appeal, the court
reinstated Lyle’s harassment claims against the defendants, leaving
the question as to whether the defendants conduct created a hostile
work environment to a jury.71 The Court of Appeal also announced a
creative necessity defense analogous to the business necessity defense,
stating that the defendants could show that their conduct did not
amount to harassment if it was within the scope of necessary job
performance and not engaged in for purely personal gratification or
other personal motives.72
The Supreme Court of California granted the defendants’ petition
for review, limiting review to whether the use of sexually coarse and
vulgar language in the workplace constitutes sexual harassment under
FEHA, and whether the imposition of liability for sexual harassment
infringes the defendants’ free speech rights.73 After reviewing the
case, the California Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, holding that Lyle did not establish a prima
facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment because her
“meager facts” failed to show that the alleged conduct was severe or
sufficiently pervasive.74 The court further ruled that, while sexually
coarse and vulgar language may constitute workplace harassment,
such conduct did not constitute sexual harassment in this case
because the defendants’ comments were not personally directed at
Lyle or other women because of sex.75 Because the California
69. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 513 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (delineating
common law causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policies
against sex discrimination, in addition to Lyle’s FEHA suit).
70. See id. at 14 (rejecting Lyle’s FEHA cause of action because it was frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation).
71. See id. (reversing the lower court’s ruling because triable issues of fact existed
as to whether the defendants’ jobs necessitated their conduct).
72. See id. at 520 (citing Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Cal. 1980)) (using
the Supreme Court of California’s definition of harassment to support its argument
that the defendants could answer a sexual harassment claim with a creative necessity
defense).
73. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476, 476 (Cal. 2004)
(granting the defendants’ petition for review, but dismissing Lyle’s).
74. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 38 Cal.4th 264, 272, 294 (2006)
(finding that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the comments were
severe or sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile work environment in violation of
FEHA). The court reasoned that the three instances cited by Lyle where the
defendant’s used derogatory epithets coupled with evidence of the actress-related
comments was not enough to establish triable issues of fact regarding hostile work
environment sexual harassment. Id. at 290-91.
75. See id. at 287 (stating that the record showed that the sexual antics and
discussions were not directed at Lyle or any other female employee because the
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Supreme remanded the case based on its finding that Lyle did not
meet the burden of proof under FEHA or Title VII and did not suffer
disparate treatment, it never directly analyzed or overruled the Court
of Appeal’s creative necessity defense.76
II. ANALYSIS
Consideration of the creative necessity defense in hostile work
environment sexual harassment cases is unwarranted because: (1)
there is no business necessity defense to disparate treatment to which
the Court of Appeal’s newly minted defense might be compared to
ensure its viability; (2) it does not comport with federal and state legal
precedent; and (3) it disregards the legislative mandate to ensure
equal employment opportunities for women and minorities.
A. The Court of Appeal Wrongly Analogized its Creative Necessity
Defense to the Business Necessity Defense
The Court of Appeal correctly determined that Lyle presented
triable issues of fact regarding sexual harassment, but it incorrectly
applied the creative necessity defense as a variation of the business
necessity defense.77 Under current common and statutory law, the
business necessity doctrine provides no basis for recognizing this
unrelated variation of the defense.78 Because the Court of Appeal
misconstrued established case law, legislation, and legal principles,
courts should not recognize the creative necessity defense as a
legitimate legal defense to hostile work environment sexual
harassment.79
conduct occurred during group meetings where both men and women were present
and participated in sharing personal sexual experiences).
76. See id. at 292 (indirectly referencing the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity
defense by agreeing with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the defendants could
prove that their conduct was not harassment if it was within “'the scope of necessary
job performance’ and not engaged in for purely personal gratification or out of
meanness or bigotry or other personal motives”). The California Supreme Court
stated, “[T]he circumstances pertaining to an employer’s type of work and to the job
duties . . . of a plaintiff and her alleged harassers are properly considered in
determining whether the harassers said or did things because of the plaintiff’s sex and
whether the subject conduct altered the terms or conditions of employment.” Id.
77. See Brief for Legal Aid, supra note 63, at 44 (rebutting that there is a creative
necessity defense to hostile work environment sexual harassment because a court’s
consideration of the type of workplace is limited to a totality of the circumstances test
pursuant to Harris and Oncale); see also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553,
563 (6th Cir. 1999) (characterizing the totality of the circumstances test as the most
basic tenet of the hostile work environment cause of action).
78. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (amending Title VII,
Congress codified the concept of business necessity as enunciated in Griggs when it
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Congress, however, did not intend this
affirmative defense for disparate treatment cases. Id. at § 2000e-2(k)(2).
79. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)
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1. The Court of Appeal Misconstrued Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment Discrimination
The Court of Appeal’s inventive effort to announce a creative
necessity defense analogous to the business necessity defense to
disparate impact discrimination is legally unsound because it conflates
two distinct theories of discrimination.80 The court failed to take into
account that business necessity is an affirmative defense to a disparate
impact claim and not sexual harassment, a form of disparate
treatment.81 Therefore, a creative necessity defense based on the
business necessity exception to disparate impact claims should not be
applied to Lyle’s sexual harassment case because she asserts a
disparate treatment claim that challenges the conditions of her
employment.82
Under the theoretical framework of disparate treatment, the
defense of business necessity may not be used against a plaintiff who
seeks to assert a claim of sexual harassment.83 Thus, the defendants
could not permissibly raise a defense premised on business necessity
to answer a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, a
(emphasizing that proper analysis of a hostile work environment requires careful
consideration of the social context in which the behavior occurs because the real
impact of such conduct depends on various surrounding circumstances). Oncale’s
social context standard does not provide for a creative necessity defense because a
trier of fact could already determine if the writers’ behavior fell within the scope of
necessary job performance under the totality of the circumstances test. Id.
80. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 332-33 (1977) (illustrating that
the Supreme Court has not applied the business necessity defense to a disparate
treatment situation, even when both theories of discrimination were at issue); see also
Timmons, supra note 47, at 1194 (discussing that courts do not think of disparate
impact and harassment law as complementary because harassment is discriminatory).
81. See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 932 (2004) (explaining that a
disparate impact case is distinct from a hostile work environment harassment case
because not every employment practice that causes a disparate impact on women and
minorities creates a working environment imbued with discrimination against
members of those protected groups). Additionally, employers charged with disparate
impact discrimination under Title VII may avoid liability by proving that the practice
that creates the disparate impact is justified by business necessity, a defense not
available to employers that have created or maintained a hostile work environment.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (establishing
that Title VII extends to facially neutral employment practices, such as employment
tests, having a disparate impact). The Supreme Court did not define business
necessity as a broad affirmative defense that applies to employment practices
unrelated to job qualifications. Id. at 431-32, 434. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2)
(providing that an employment practice justified by business necessity is not a defense
against a claim of disparate treatment).
83. See L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does
Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 365 (2005) (clarifying that Johnson Controls
stands for the proposition that disparate impact analysis, particularly disparate impact
defenses, cannot be exercised against a plaintiff who asserted a claim of disparate
treatment).
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form of disparate treatment.84
Admittedly, the Court of Appeal could argue that the Supreme
Court and Congress did not foreclose the possibility of raising a
disparate impact defense against a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim because the definition of job relatedness does not
specifically outline the type of employment practices the defense
covers.85 However, the judicial and legislative branches did not
define job relatedness, the threshold requirement of business
necessity, in terms of such practices because harassing conduct cannot
be presumed to be facially neutral.86 Rather, they created and
codified the business necessity defense to apply to an employer’s
qualification standards or selection practices for hiring and
promotion.87
Accordingly, a disparate impact analysis is
inappropriate for Lyle’s claim because she is not challenging Warner
Brothers’ qualification standards, selection process for hiring or
promotion, or termination decisions.88 To the contrary, Lyle asserted
that the writers subjected her to racial and sexual harassment through
offensive comments and bigoted jokes.89
Because Lyle never alleged a disparate impact discrimination claim
against the defendants, it is irrelevant that the writers argue that their
conduct was necessary for producing “Friends.”90 Their practice of
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(k)(2) (codifying that the business necessity defense is
not available against a claim of intentional discrimination).
85. See Hébert, supra note 83, at 345 (postulating that the disparate impact
theory might appropriately be used to challenge sexually harassing behavior in cases
where the absence of intent to discriminate or the absence of different treatment of
men and women is a barrier to the applicability of the disparate treatment theory).
But see Rebecca Hanner White, There’s Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme
Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 738-39 (1999)
(arguing that the impact approach to sexual harassment claims is incorrect because
sexual harassment is intentional discrimination).
86. See Steven Wellborn, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fare
of Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, n.45
(contending that sexual harassment cases fail to satisfy the disparate impact model
because the conduct is not sex-neutral).
87. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982) (discussing the
requirement that employees must pass a written examination for promotion
consideration); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 327 (1977) (discussing the
requirement that job applicants meet a certain height and weight); see also Timmons,
supra note 47, at 1195 (arguing that the Supreme Court intended to extend the
business necessity defense only to employment practices that are not caused by the
sex of any person in the workplace).
88. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 515 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (alleging hostile
work environment harassment based on the fact that Lyle personally witnessed the
writers’ gender denigrating conduct during the meetings she had a duty to attend).
89. See id. (arguing that because Lyle was often the only female writers’ assistant
in the writers’ room, she could not overlook or ignore the defendants’ offensive
comments and behavior).
90. See Int’l Union United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
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sharing blow job stories, talking out rape fantasies, and drawing
enlarged genitalia in pornographic coloring books does not manifest
a relationship to Lyle’s qualifications for employment because, as the
defendants admitted at trial, the practices at issue relate to their jobs
as scriptwriters.91 If Warner Brothers followed the Court of Appeal’s
business necessity analogy and asserted the creative necessity defense,
the defendants would have to demonstrate that publicly discussing
personal sexual exploits relates to and/or measures Lyle’s typing
abilities and other skills necessary for her successful job
performance.92 Such an application of this variation on the business
necessity defense illuminates the inappropriateness of the Court of
Appeal’s analogy.93
The discrimination Lyle challenges does not involve pass/fail or
qualified/unqualified barriers to tangible job benefits; rather, it
involves workplace conduct that evinced hostility toward women and
minorities and affected the conditions of her employment.94
Furthermore, Lyle’s choice to base her sexual harassment claim in the
disparate treatment theoretical framework is appropriate because the
writers’ conduct was likely based on stereotypical notions that women
exist for the sexual pleasure of men and/or they wanted to make the
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (stating that whether an
employment practice involves disparate treatment does not depend on why the
employer discriminates, but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination); see
also Wellborn, supra note 86, at n.45 (suggesting that the disparate impact model is
inappropriate for sexual harassment cases).
91. Compare Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513 (maintaining that the offensive and
bigoted comments and jokes were an indispensable means of developing gags,
dialogue, and story lines for “Friends”), with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 796 (1973) (refusing to rehire an employee who engaged in illegal activity
against the employer), and Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th
Cir. 1972) (requiring airline pilot applicants to have a certain amount of previous
flying experience). Creative necessity cannot be analogized to the business necessity
defense because the writers’ behavior is wholly unlike these miscellaneous
employment practices that courts justified as business necessity.
92. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (explaining that
a practice, which is a business necessity, must be predictive of or significantly
correlated with the elements of the work that comprises the job for which the
candidate is being evaluated).
93. See Wellborn, supra note 86, at n.45 (arguing that the disparate impact
model is ill-suited for harassment cases because the conduct being challenged is
generally not sex neutral and it would be too difficult to demonstrate how women are
disproportionately affected by harassing conduct).
94. See Timmons, supra note 47, at 1180 (contending that pornography,
discussions of sex, and other sexual conduct such as sex-related jokes can constitute
disparate treatment of women when the conduct is motivated by a sexual desire for
the plaintiff, when the conduct is directed only at women, or when the conduct is
intended to intimidate or affect women); see also Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A.
Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With a Particular Application to Sexual
Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1085 (1999) (stating the men flaunt symbols of
male sexuality by using obscene language, exhibiting their genitalia, and posting
pornographic pictures when they want to drive women out of the workplace).
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workplace uncomfortable for Lyle and other female employees.95
The writers’ sexual comments, jokes, and epithets expressed gender
hostility.96 Similarly, their choice to display pornographic images
depicting cheerleaders with their legs spread apart while in Lyle’s
presence conveyed the message that they see women as sex objects.97
Because the writers’ employment practice is distinct from aptitude
tests, education requirements, and previous experience qualifications,
the Court of Appeal’s analogy between business necessity and creative
necessity is an unwarranted leap of logic and, therefore, should not be
recognized.98
2. The Court of Appeal Misconstrued Case Law When Analogizing
Creative Necessity to Business Necessity
a. The Court of Appeal Erred When Misapplying the Supreme
Court’s Oncale Standard
The Court of Appeal correctly stated that the workplace context is
one of the many factors a trier of fact analyzes in a sexual harassment
claim; however, this single factor cannot justify a separate defense that
the defendants may assert to avoid liability under Title VII or FEHA.99
Pursuant to Oncale, evidence about the specific workplace context in
a sexual harassment case is properly considered as part of the totality
of the circumstances test, but it is not a defense to a hostile work
environment.100 This Supreme Court precedent contemplates what
95. See DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that sexual harassment consists of efforts by coworkers or supervisors to make the
workplace intolerable or at least severely and discriminatorily uncongenial for
women); see also Dorothy Roberts, The Collective Injury to Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 365, 367 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004) (noting that males exhibit sexual conduct in the workplace to
protect “male” jobs from intrusion by women or to insure that women incorporate
into the workplace on inferior terms).
96. See, e.g., Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(finding that the defendant’s use of vulgarities, such as “stupid cunt,” “dickbreath,”
and “asshole” constituted sex-based harassment).
97. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that the display of nude female pictures conveys the
message that women do not belong in the workplace).
98. See Brief for Legal Aid, supra note 63, at 43 (arguing that the creative
necessity defense is impermissible because it is not rooted in the disparate treatment
theory).
99. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)
(providing nothing to suggest that a creative necessity defense can be justified by the
instruction to consider the totality of the circumstances).
100. See id. (stating that proper analysis of a hostile work environment requires
careful consideration of the social context in which the behavior occurs because the
real impact of such conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances, but offering
nothing else); Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that
Oncale instructs that the severity of the alleged harassment be assessed in light of the
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activity is within the scope of necessary job performance, thus proper
application of the Oncale social context standard would render the
creative necessity defense superfluous.101 Because the Court of
Appeal misread and misapplied the Oncale social context standard, its
creative necessity defense cannot stand.102
The Supreme Court unanimously held that sexual harassment must
constitute discrimination within the meaning of Title VII; that is, a
plaintiff in a hostile work environment case must plead and ultimately
prove the statutory requirement that discrimination arose because of
sex.103 By rejecting the idea that sexual conduct is a substitute for
Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement,104 the Court ensured that no
special defense was necessary to protect creative employers’ legitimate
business interests because a plaintiff must still establish that her
environment is both objectively and subjectively hostile.105 If Lyle
cannot prove that the nature of her work environment, however
unpleasant, resulted because of her sex, she is not a victim of hostile
work environment sexual harassment.106 Thus, a trier of fact could
not hold the defendants liable simply because their harassing
behavior is offensive or insensitive.107
The Oncale Court further emphasized that when the trier of fact
analyzes the objective severity of harassment, it should consider the
workplace’s social context, but never suggesting that the prevailing culture of the
workplace can excuse discriminatory conduct).
101. See Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment
Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 438 (2002) (arguing that Oncale endorses
that courts examine the record to determine whether vulgar language and unpleasant
conduct is a normal part of the workplace and, therefore, the standard already takes
into account whether communications are actually necessary to the business or
enterprise).
102. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999)
(emphasizing that a court cannot point to the nature of the workplace alone to
excuse hostile work environment harassment because it should look at the totality of
the circumstances).
103. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006))
(affirming that Title VII is only directed at discrimination because of sex).
104. See id. at 80 (reiterating that Title VII does not prohibit all verbal and
physical harassment and that the Court has never recognized that harassment is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have
sexual content or connotations).
105. See id. at 81 (stating that conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile work environment is beyond Title VII’s purview).
106. See id. at 80 (establishing that a plaintiff must demonstrate that she suffered
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment because of her sex to successfully
prove her claim of sexual harassment).
107. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (declaring that not all
workplace conduct, such as an offensive utterance, constitutes actionable
harassment); see also Frank, supra note 101, at 468 (explaining that liability only
arises when there is a causal nexus between the harassment and the employee’s
protected attribute of sex).
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totality of the circumstances while paying careful attention to the
social context in which the alleged harassment occurs and is
experienced by the plaintiff.108 This directive suggests that different
workplace environments alter how the plaintiff interprets and receives
Accordingly, an
allegedly harassing words and conduct.109
examination of a hostile work environment claim in light of the social
context standard allows a reasonable trier of fact to determine if the
“Friends” writers’ conduct related to their job of producing an adultoriented sitcom.110 The Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense
is unnecessary because consideration of the social mores of the
television writers’ room allows the trier of fact to determine whether:
(1) the writers’ words and conduct were truly harassment or nothing
more than office banter;111 (2) the writers’ words and conduct were
unwelcome or just accepted as unpleasant sophomoric behavior;112
and (3) the writers’ speech and conduct were designed to harm Lyle
because of her sex or instead served the legitimate business purpose
of producing a sitcom.113
Because the social context standard allows for the writers’ sexual
speech and expressive conduct, as long as it is not objectively and
subjectively hostile, the defendants do not need the Court of Appeal’s
creative necessity defense to convince a jury that the nature of writing
for a television comedy necessitates talking about blow jobs, anal sex,
and rape.114 Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity
defense does not comport with Oncale.

108. See Frank, supra note 101, at 466 (stating that courts have reasoned that
certain blue-collar work environments and their traditionally unrefined atmosphere
are relevant to evaluating the “because of sex” requirement in a hostile work
environment analysis).
109. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (explaining that the real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances
that is not captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed).
110. See id. (commenting that an appropriate sensitivity to social context and
common sense will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or
roughhousing and conduct that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would
find severely hostile or abusive).
111. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (recognizing that words
that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another).
112. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982)
(requiring that the plaintiff must show that the harassing conduct was unwelcome to
prove a claim of sexual harassment).
113. See Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the
Oncale standard allows judges and juries to make the threshold determination
whether certain forms of behavior in a given workplace are discriminatory or not).
114. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (ensuring that the trier of fact can use common
sense to distinguish horseplay, flirtation, and the like from harassment).
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b. The Court of Appeal Misread the Supreme Court of
California’s Reno v. Baird
The Court of Appeal also misconstrued state case law when
gathering support for its creative necessity defense.115 In Reno v.
Baird, the Supreme Court of California did not seek to define the
parameters of unlawful harassing conduct under FEHA.116 Rather,
the court explained the differences between harassment and
discrimination and why the distinction mattered for supervisor
liability.117
The Supreme Court of California concluded that
supervisor liability could only be predicated on harassment because
the nature of “harassment consists of a type of conduct not necessary
for performance of a supervisory job,” as opposed to discrimination
that arises out of employment practices necessary for personnel
management.118 Reno does not stand for the proposition that
Warner Brothers can escape liability for sexual harassment if they can
prove that the writers’ choice of words or conduct was necessary for
creating a comedic sitcom.119
Oncale and Reno cannot be read to suggest that Warner Brothers
may answer Lyle’s claim of sexual harassment with a creative necessity
defense, which would allow the writers to avoid liability if their
conduct was necessary for the performance of producing “Friends.”
Because the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense is premised
on a misreading and misapplication of the business necessity
exception to disparate impact discrimination, the Oncale standard,
and the Reno definition of harassment, it is an impermissible legal
standard.120 The issue is not and should not be whether the writers’
behavior was job related, but rather, when considering the totality of

115. See Brief for the Employers Group et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 11, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004)
(No. S125271), 2005 WL 847603 (arguing that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning based
on Reno was misplaced because the Reno court did not address how the context of
alleged wrongful speech or expressive conduct may bear upon an harassment claim).
116. See 957 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Cal. 1998) (deciding whether persons claiming
discrimination may sue their supervisors individually and hold them liable for
damages).
117. See id. at 1336 (distinguishing between harassment as a type of conduct not
necessary to a supervisor’s job performance and business decisions that might later be
considered discriminatory but are necessary to the supervisor’s performance).
118. See id. (proffering that employment-related decisions cannot constitute
actionable harassment because personnel decisions are fundamentally different from
conduct that is avoidable and unnecessary).
119. See id. (finding that necessary personnel actions such as hiring or firing, work
station assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, deciding who
will attend meetings, and the like do not come within the meaning of harassment).
120. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (arguing that Oncale precludes employers
from framing claims under a disparate impact theory in sexual harassment cases).
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the circumstances, whether their behavior created a hostile work
environment.121
B. The Lyle Decision Undermines the Purpose of Title VII and FEHA
Because it Narrows the Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Doctrine
In Lyle, the Court of Appeal’s surprising decision to recognize a
creative necessity defense ignores the legislative intent underlying
Title VII and FEHA.122 While the federal and state civil rights laws
aim to cure employment discrimination on the basis of sex, the
creative necessity defense narrows the hostile work environment
sexual harassment doctrine because it could allow defendants to
disguise discriminatory conduct in an indefinite number of “creative”
workplaces.123
It is understandable that the court found merit in the defendants’
argument that sexually explicit discussion is a necessary element of
creating the adult-oriented sitcom “Friends,” but the court
misconceived the nature of its role when it recognized the creative
necessity defense.124 The legislatures established a framework for
courts to evaluate hostile work environment sexual harassment claims
under Title VII and FEHA;125 however, the framework does not give
121. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(announcing that the critical issue is whether, when considering all the
circumstances, the employers or coworkers exposed the plaintiff to disadvantageous
terms and conditions of employment that members of the opposite sex did not
suffer).
122. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (confirming that
Congress’ objective in enacting Title VII was to achieve equal employment
opportunities by removing barriers that operate in favor of an identifiable group over
the other employees); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 12920 (West 2005) (declaring that
it is necessary to safeguard against the practice of denying employment opportunities
or discriminating in the terms of employment because it causes domestic strife,
deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and
advancement, and adversely affects the interests of employees, employers, and the
general public).
123. Cf. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999)
(asserting that a woman who chooses to work in a male-dominated trade does not
relinquish her right to be free from sexual harassment). The court found it illogical
that the lower court would excuse harassing conduct because it took place in a blue
collar environment and argued that such reasoning means that the more hostile the
environment and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title VII
plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute
actionable harassment. Id.
124. See id. (claiming that courts cannot point to long-standing or traditional
hostility toward women to excuse hostile work environment harassment, even when
considering the nature of the workplace).
125. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2006) (requiring courts to find that the harassing
conduct was based on sex and was severe or pervasive enough to alter the employee’s
working conditions); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(1) (West 2005) (mandating that
the trier of fact find that an employer or supervisor harassed the employee because of
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the Court of Appeal discretion to insulate harassing conduct from the
reach of these civil rights statutes simply because it took place in the
context of a creative environment.126 By announcing the creative
necessity defense, the Court of Appeal departed from the legislative
intent of promoting and enforcing workplace equality.127
1. The Court of Appeal’s Creative Necessity Defense Ignores Federal
and State Legislative Intent
a. The Court of Appeal Must Interpret Title VII and FEHA in
Accordance with Legislative Intent
When considering statutory issues, the Court of Appeal must
ascertain the intent of the legislature to carry out the purpose of the
anti-discrimination laws.128 To act in conformity with legislative
intent, the court was required to remedy any sexual harassment
during the production of “Friends,” advance the purpose of
workplace equality, and avoid judicial interpretations or inventions
that allow for the continuance of discriminatory conduct.129 The
legislative intent should have governed the decision in this case;
however, the Court of Appeal ignored this standard of judgment
when formulating the creative necessity defense,130 a judicial
invention that fails to remedy sexual harassment because it could
sex).
126. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (rejecting the view that the standard for sexual
harassment varies depending on the work environment); Alex Chun, Hostile La Vista,
Baby. Hollywood Lawyer’s Delicate Task: Making Harassment Claims Go Away, L.A.
DAILY J., Sept. 27, 1997, available at http://www.rmslaw.com/in_the_media/art1.htm
(stating that it is not a defense to sexual harassment for entertainment employers to
claim that sexual joking is prevalent in the industry, and, thus, that the plaintiff knew
what she was getting into).
127. See Christopher W. Deering, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to ReExamine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII’s Ban on Discrimination “Because Of”
Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 270 (1996-97) (arguing that a court’s reliance on a narrow
application of Title VII inappropriately trammels the statute because it ignores the
Congressional intent to construe the statue broadly and, thus, fails to eliminate the
unfairness and humiliation of harassment).
128. See Day v. City of Fontana, 25 Cal. 4th 268, 272 (2001) (insisting that courts
have the fundamental task of ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers to effectuate
the purpose of the statute); see also SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:5
(Norman J. Singer ed., 6th ed. 2005) (explaining that the separation of powers
principle mandates that the judiciary construe statutes so that they carry out the will
of the lawmakers).
129. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 128, § 45:5 (expressing a classic formulation of
statutory interpretation that requires judges to consider: (1) the common law before
passing the act; (2) the evil that the common law did not cure; (3) the remedy the
legislative body appointed to cure the evil; and (4) the true reason for the remedy).
130. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (overlooking legislative
intent by failing to cite any principle of statutory construction or consulting the policy
goals of the federal or state legislatures to justify the defense it proposes).
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allow the defendants to avoid liability and damages under Title VII
and FEHA.131 Had the court followed the standard of statutory
interpretation, which includes consulting the legislative history, the
language of the statute, and the policy behind the anti-discrimination
laws,132 it would have recognized that creative necessity cannot serve
as a legitimate legal defense to hostile work environment sexual
harassment because it undermines the federal and state legislatures’
expressed intent of removing arbitrary barriers to sexual equality in
the workplace.133
b. Title VII and FEHA Do Not Support the Creative Necessity
Defense
The text of Title VII and FEHA does not support the Court of
Appeal’s creative necessity defense. The statutory text is the starting
point for assessing Lyle’s cause of action, which is rooted in Title VII
and FEHA’s prohibitions.134 On their face, the statutes do not
instruct courts to consider the context of Warner Brothers’ workplace
as a defense to hostile work environment sexual harassment.135
Although Title VII and FEHA regulate discrimination on the different
bases of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, the statutes
apply the same prohibitions to all forms of discriminatory conduct
regardless of whether it takes place in a blue-collar shipyard, a law
firm, or a television writers’ room.136 This suggests that no special
131. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (discussing that a disparate impact-based
legal principle would prevent a hostile work environment sexual harassment plaintiff
from recovering damages because she suffered no out-of-pocket loss and, therefore, it
would conflict with Congress’ intent to provide remedies as a means for deterring
intentional discrimination).
132. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859,
862, 866 (1984) (enunciating standards for the judicial interpretation of statutes and
looking to statutory language, legislative history, and policy).
133. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (describing employees’ conduct of displaying pornographic images and
using derogatory, sexist language as actionable behavior that creates a barrier to the
progress of women in the workplace because it communicates that they do not
belong and that they must subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes that
permeate that environment).
134. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978)
(affirming that logic and precedent dictate that the starting point of every case
involving statutory analysis begins with the text).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2005) (articulating the burden of proof for disparate
impact cases, but nowhere promulgating factors to consider when deciding a
disparate treatment sexual harassment case); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) (West
2005) (delineating no factors for consideration in a hostile work environment case).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a)
(proscribing employment practices that discriminate against an applicant or
employee because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital
status, sex, age, or sexual orientation).
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exemption exists for creative workplaces within the framework of
these anti-discrimination laws.137 Their text recognizes one general
standard for different types of hostile work environments;138 thus, the
creative necessity defense is inconsistent with federal and state
legislative intent because it fails to treat employers and employees in
different industries similarly under the law.139
The Court of Appeal could argue that its function is to fill gaps in
the anti-discrimination laws and remedy legislative oversights.140 This
argument has merit, especially when considering that the federal
judiciary created the hostile work environment doctrine in light of the
fact that Title VII did not expressly mention or define harassment.141
However, a close examination of the Title VII and FEHA’s language
reveals that the legislatures did not intend to limit or narrow the
reach of the statutes and contemplated that the writers’ sex-related
behavior could constitute actionable harassment.142 Instead of
correcting a defect in Title VII, the Court of Appeal’s creative
necessity defense will not only insulate discriminatory behavior, but
also cause problems for courts and litigants.143
i. The Creative Necessity Defense Ignores Title VII’s Statutory
Language
The key to enforcing sexual harassment law is to ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent, which courts primarily obtain from the
137. See Frank, supra note 101, at 516 (stating that the same level of scrutiny
should be applied to all sexual harassment claims across the board, regardless of
whether the workplace is populated with “ruffians or royalty”).
138. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998)
(rationalizing that, although racial and sexual harassment take on different forms, it
makes sense to harmonize the Title VII standards).
139. See, e.g., Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194 (4th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the view that the text of Title VII permits an exception for
harassment that takes place in the context of strenuous work).
140. See N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)
(recognizing that federal courts have given broad and ambiguous statutes concrete
meaning through case-by-case judicial decisions in the common law tradition); see
also Frank, supra note 101, at 519 (arguing that if courts are free to fill the gaps in the
law, they are also free to create the standards and burdens of, as well as defenses to
hostile work environment claims).
141. See Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 775 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that Title VII
does not explicitly mention hostile work environment, nor use any terms to describe
the conduct it includes).
142. See generally New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931) (declaring
that judicial common law is subject to the paramount authority of Congress). The
Court of Appeal cannot limit the scope of Title VII or FEHA because the lawmaking
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial branch of government. Id.
143. Cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1996) (reasoning that a law
fails to be fair if it is so vague that it leaves the public uncertain as to what conduct is
prohibited or leaves judges and juries, without any legally fixed standard, free to
decide what is and is not prohibited).
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plain meaning of Title VII’s language.144 The plain meaning rule
assumes that the legislature intended the ordinary meaning of the
statute.145 The plain language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 forbids an employer from discriminating against any individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual’s sex.146 The federal statute’s
language, however, does not expressly define the phrase “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”147 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court decided that Congress’s choice not to specifically
define what constitutes hostile work environment sexual harassment
evinces its intent to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment,”148 especially since
courts must construe Title VII liberally.149 Because Title VII does not
enumerate specific discriminatory practices or define the parameters
of such harassing conduct, the broad statutory language reveals that
Congress contemplated that television writers’ sexually coarse and
vulgar speech could possibly create the hostile work environment
harassment Title VII aims to eliminate.150 Consequently, the Court of
Appeal was not free to read unwarranted meanings into Title VII,151
144. See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986) (stating that courts look
first to the language of the statute to determine the legislature’s intent).
145. See, e.g., State v. Young, 465 A.2d 1375, 1376 (Vt. 1983) (assuming that the
plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language was intended by the
legislature). But see State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales, 475 N.W.2d 210, 218
(Iowa 1991) (noting that legislative intent can be expressed by omission as well as by
the inclusion of language).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (condemning the disparate treatment of
female employees).
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (failing to articulate what constitutes actionable
harassment and not expressly defining unlawful conduct because Title VII was
designed for courts to construe and apply the remedial statute liberally).
148. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (rejecting the view
that Title VII’s language shows that Congress intended to limit the reach of the
statute to economic barriers erected by discrimination).
149. See Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (stating the Civil Rights
Act was intended to protect, defend, and provide remedies for wrongs to all people
and should be liberally and beneficently construed); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that Congress intentionally drafted Title VII in the
broadest possible terms so that it could reach all forms of harassment).
150. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972) (declaring that Title
VII’s language evinces Congress’ intent to define discrimination in the broadest
possible terms because it knew that constant change in the workforce would make
seemingly reasonable practices of the present become the injustices of the future);
see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (extending
Title VII to cover same-sex harassment illustrated that the statutory provisions go
beyond the principle evil for which they were enacted to cover reasonably
comparable evils).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (recognizing the business necessity defense in
disparate impact cases, but nowhere providing for the same defense to disparate
treatment or an exception for unique workplaces); see also Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v.
Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
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even to support the supposedly desirable policy of balancing the
writers’ free speech rights, which is not a goal of the statute as
written.152 Because the Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense
potentially carves out an exception for the writers’ sexual conduct, it
undermines the intent of Congress because it could allow for the
continuance of harassment in creative workplaces, the harm Title VII
seeks to remedy.153
ii. The Creative Necessity Defense Disregards FEHA’s Statutory
Language
Similarly, the plain language of FEHA reveals that the California
legislature chose not to limit harassment to any particular kind of
conduct because the state, like the federal government, intended to
broadly extend its civil rights law as far as needed to remedy the
sexual harassment that prevents workplace equality for women and
minorities.154
Although FEHA also does not explicitly define
harassment, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Commission
extends the definition of harassment to epithets, derogatory
comments or slurs, and derogatory posters, cartoons, or drawings.155
This regulatory language further illuminates the state’s intent to
eliminate sexually-themed speech and conduct that amounts to
harassment in the workplace.156 Therefore, the language of FEHA
U.S. 337, 340 (1997)) (asserting that a court’s inquiry in analyzing a statute ceases if
the plain meaning of the statute conveys congressional intent and the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (stating no reference to free speech issues in the
workplace); see also Taravella v. Stanley, 727 A.2d 727, 731 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)
(stating that courts may not read provisions into clearly expressed legislation that are
not expressed in its words).
153. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)) (stating that Congress enacted Title VII to eradicate the
imbalance of power and abuse that results in discrimination against a discrete and
vulnerable group); see also Joanna Grossman, Are ‘Friends’ Writers ‘Required to
Engage in Sexual Banter?, CNN, May 24, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05
/04/grossman.friends/ (arguing that the creative necessity defense will preserve the
sexism in the entertainment industry).
154. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2006) (prohibiting employers from
discriminating in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of an
employee’s sex, but failing to define the term “harassment,” the phrase “because of,”
or any particular type of conduct, thus, indicating broad construction).
155. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (2006) (recognizing that verbal and visual
harassment can unreasonably interfere with an individual’s work performance and
create a hostile environment).
156. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 850 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (approving the FEHC’s position that almost any type of conduct may
constitute sexual harassment); see also Am. Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. Alexander,
294 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.D.C. 1968) (noting that civil rights legislation has
delegated broad discretion to the administrative agencies, and the courts have paid
substantial respect to the administrative interpretations of such laws).
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reasonably covers the situation in the “Friends” writers’ room. The
defendants’ discussions of oral and anal sex, rape fantasies, and
missed opportunities to “fuck” the actresses Courtney Cox and
Jennifer Aniston, as well as their habits of viewing and depicting
pornographic images, fall within the range of actionable conduct
established by the FEHC because the regulatory language uses the
word “includes,” signifying that the components of the statute can be
enlarged.157 Consequently, the defendants’ sexually coarse and
vulgar speech can constitute sexual harassment within the meaning of
statute, even when such conduct serves the creative process.158
Because the defendants could assert the creative necessity defense as a
pretext to preserve workplace hostility or excuse their harassing
conduct, the Court of Appeal’s decision conflicts with the purpose of
FEHA.159
iii. The Creative Necessity Defense Undermines the Statutory
Scheme of FEHA as a Whole
Although courts first examine the plain language of a statute to
discern legislative intent, the Supreme Court recognized that statutory
language considered in isolation from the context of the whole Act
may not accurately convey legislative intent.160 Accordingly, a court
must construe FEHA so all parts of the statutory scheme operate in
harmony and further the intent of the California legislature.161
Therefore, it was improper for the Court of Appeal to rest its decision
in Lyle primarily on Section 12940 of FEHA.162
157. See Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 926 (Wash. 2001)
(stating that use of the word “includes” means courts can extend the scope of the
statute); see also Fisher, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (noting that FEHC’s non-exhaustive list
of actionable harassment, as an administrative interpretation of the statute, should be
accorded great respect by the courts and followed if not clearly erroneous).
158. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (reading Title VII’s
broad-gauged language as proscribing conduct that destroys the emotional and
psychological stability of women and minorities).
159. See Grossman, supra note 153 (suggesting that the Court of Appeal’s logic
means that if indelicate forms of expression are accepted and endured as normal
human behavior by many males and some women, then other women cannot sue).
160. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (stating that courts
must follow the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole since the meaning
of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context).
161. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631-32
(1973) (stating that it is the Court’s task in interpreting separate provisions of an Act
to give the statute the most harmonious meaning possible in light of the legislative
policy and purpose); Dyna-Med v. FEHC, 743 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Cal. 1987)
(emphasizing that statutes must be construed in context with the statutory purpose
and must be harmonized with the statutory sections relating to the same subject).
162. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (declaring that it is the
Court’s responsibility to look to the provisions of the whole law and to its object and
policy when considering statutory issues).
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Rather, the court should have considered this hostile work
environment sexual harassment case in light of the related FEHA
provisions and legislative history, which make clear that it is the State’s
public policy to safeguard Lyle’s civil right to seek, obtain, and hold
employment without discrimination on the basis of her sex.163
Although the Court of Appeal recognized that creative necessity only
operates as a limited defense to hostile work environment sexual
harassment, it failed to fulfill its judicial duty of applying FEHA in
accordance with its legislative intent. The defense is inconsistent with
the State’s policy of ensuring the development and advancement of a
diverse workforce because it insulates a category of otherwise
actionable conduct, creating a barrier to Lyle’s promotion in the field
of sitcom writing and conveying the message that women are not
welcome in Hollywood unless they tolerate sexual stereotypes.164 The
creative necessity defense permits the writers to engage in conduct
that would otherwise be discriminatory in different work settings;165
thus, it goes against the intent of the legislature since it frustrates the
goals of anti-discrimination law by allowing environments that have
traditionally been dominated by men and hostile to women to remain
that way.166
2. The Vague and Overbroad Framework of the Creative Necessity
Defense Contravenes the Purpose of Title VII and FEHA
The vague and overly broad creative necessity defense167 is
inconsistent with the federal and state policy of prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of any protected

163. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (West 2005) (declaring it public policy to
protect an individual’s right to nondiscriminatory employment); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
12921 (West 2005) (asserting that it is an employee’s “civil right” to seek, obtain, and
hold employment without suffering discrimination).
164. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (expressing that FEHA’s purpose is to provide
effective remedies that will eliminate the cause and effect of discriminatory practices).
165. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 520 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (stating that the
defendants may convince the jury that the artistic process for producing episodes of
“Friends” necessitates conduct that might be unacceptable in other contexts).
166. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1990) (contending that
harassers should not be able to continue to harass merely because a particular
discriminatory practice is commonplace because it leaves victims with no remedy);
Grossman, supra note 153 (contending that traditionally male work environments
cannot be exempted from contemporary standards of equality, especially since it is
these environments in which such standards must be rigorously enforced).
167. See Frank, supra note 101, at 491 (commenting that courts have failed to
discover guiding principles that effectively distinguish between unpleasant banter and
full-blown harassment when applying judicial inventions).
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The court’s approach potentially creates an
classification.168
exemption for creative workplaces and conduct that is normally
viewed as discriminatory in other settings, allowing for employers and
employees to engage in discriminatory sexual (or racial, religious,
ageist) speech without fear of reprisal169 and reducing protection for
many victims.170 When formulating this defense, the Court of Appeal
failed to outline what constitutes a creative workplace.171 Is the
defense strictly limited to television production, or can employers in
academia, advertising, film production, magazines, theater
production, publishing, or even automobile design assert it against a
claim of sexual harassment?172 The Court of Appeal did not create a
principle whereby a judge or jury could differentiate between various
cases and creative contexts.173
The defense, as articulated by the Court of Appeal, is so broad that
many types of conduct, which are clearly within the federal and state
governments’ power to prohibit under Title VII and FHEA, will be
allowed, such as vulgar speech and conduct continually directed at

168. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (mandating that
employment practices that are neutral on their face or in their intent cannot be
maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo of prior discrimination); see also
Grossman, supra note 153 (arguing that applying a more lenient standard for sexual
harassment to comedy writers could mean that women will continue to feel like
outsiders in the environment of the entertainment industry).
169. See Brief for Legal Aid, supra note 63, at 44 (arguing that the creative
necessity defense would create a blanket exemption for any industry that deems itself
“creative,” permitting any type of words or conduct in the workplace that leads to the
final product).
170. See Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (contending
that special consideration for certain workplaces lowers the hostile work environment
standard, making it more difficult for victims to have a successful sexual harassment
claim).
171. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 520 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. granted, 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271) (offering no
clarification as to what constitutes a creative workplace other than a reiteration of the
state supreme court’s definition of harassment to support the creative necessity
defense).
172. See Daniel E. Eaton, Writers Gone Wild: “The Muse Made Me Do It” As a
Defense to a Claim of Sexual Harassment, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, n.54 (2004)
(arguing that restricting creative necessity to the arts ignores the inherently creative
nature of many occupations not generally considered creative, but that require the
same kind of creative freedom indispensable to the arts); Brief for Alliance of Motion
Picture and Television Producers et al. in Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
24, Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004) (No. S125271),
2005 WL 847606 [hereinafter Brief for Alliance] (asking if a museum guard can sue
for harassment if she had to look at an exhibit featuring Playboy centerfolds and
listen to stupid, sexist, and lewd comments from patrons).
173. See Breda v. Wolf Camera, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2001)
(insisting that the current case law makes it more difficult to determine the severity
and quantity of gesturing, touching, and banter necessary to create a hostile work
environment than “nailing a jellyfish to the wall”).
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women generally.174 Although the Court of Appeal explained that
the creative necessity defense has limits, it failed to specify a standard
of permissible conduct.175 The Court explained that a trier of fact
could find that the writers’ sexually explicit conduct fell within the
scope of necessary job performance if they did not engage in such
behavior for purely personal gratification or other personal
motives.176 But it failed to define the line where sexually explicit
conduct would no longer be deemed work related, and rather would
be viewed as personally gratifying. 177 Consequently, it is unclear how
a trier of fact will meaningfully determine if writing an episode of
“Friends” necessitated the writers’ sexual speech and conduct.178
Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s failure to specify permissible
conduct in the context of a creative work environment poses an unfair
burden on Warner Brothers and the writers to prove that their
sexually-themed speech was necessary to their job performance.179
When an employer or employee cannot predict how a trier of fact will
apply or evaluate the creative necessity defense in recurring factual
situations, they cannot know the scope of legal protection afforded to
them.180 The vagueness of the creative necessity defense makes it
impossible for a supervisor or employer to know in advance whether
their conduct is illegal, which could lead to two extreme
consequences. On one hand, the creative necessity defense could
174. See Grossman, supra note 153 (recognizing that if the creative necessity
defense is too broad, sexual harassment cases may be unsuccessful, despite the reality
of the discrimination it is seeking to correct).
175. See Lyle, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 520 (admitting that the creative necessity defense
had limits by stating that writers could not kiss, fondle, or caress assistants for the
purpose of developing a love scene, nor could they make lewd, offensive, or
demeaning remarks personally directed at assistants).
176. See id. (relying, albeit improperly, on the Reno definition of harassment that
explains that harassment is not conduct that is necessary for management of the
employer’s business).
177. See id. (providing no guidance for applying or evaluating the creative
necessity defense other than stating that the defendants cannot engage in such
conduct for meanness or bigotry).
178. See Grossman, supra note 153 (illustrating that a judge or jury could view the
episode of “Friends” in which the character Rachel seduces a coworker by dressing up
as a cheerleader as arising out of the many lewd drawings of naked cheerleaders and
the writers’ personal fantasies, or they could determine that the construction of the
episode did not necessitate the writers’ sexual conduct).
179. See Eaton, supra note 172, at 1, 7 (2004) (voicing that because there are an
infinite number of ways to express and conceive any idea, the writers face a
tremendous burden to prove that the nature of their workplace necessitated such
expression).
180. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 771 (1998) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s vague affirmative defense to sexual harassment
because the rule drew no support from established legal principles and did not
explain how employers could rely on the affirmative defense thus leading to
confusion).
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chill creative speech because employers will be forced to limit the
content of workplace discussions and writers will be forced to censor
themselves.181 On the other hand, employers could under-regulate
the workplace and employees might not police their own conduct
because neither group knows the scope of the creative necessity
defense and views it as overly protective.182
Courts should not apply the creative necessity defense to hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims because it cannot be
interpreted narrowly.183 If this newly minted defense is recognized by
courts, it will potentially emasculate Title VII and FEHA because by
allowing employers to deny employment opportunities, slow
diversification of writers’ rooms, cause minority employees strife,
preserve male-dominated fields, and adversely affect the interest of
employees, employers, and the public.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Creative Necessity Defense Will Maintain Sexism in the
Television Industry
Hollywood remains fraught with sexism184 and the Court of
Appeal’s creative necessity defense will entrench the “boys club”
atmosphere of television writing.185 Male comedy writers have
dominated the field of sitcom writing for decades, while females have
had great difficulty breaking into the field.186 If comedy writers are
181. See Brief for Alliance, supra note 172, at 41 (illustrating that the creative
necessity defense will force comedy writers to ask themselves before speaking:
"Should I say this potentially offensive thing, that might be funny enough to be part
of the script, or will it be considered not good enough to be written down, thereby
subjecting me, and my employer, to potential liability?”).
182. See Frank, supra note 101, at 495 (arguing that vague legal standards in
sexual harassment law may cause employers to overlook harassing conduct since they
do not know what is prohibited).
183. Cf. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971)
(explaining that Congress meant to limit the affirmative defenses to Title VII because
it did not intend to open an enormous gap in the law that would exist if employers
could legitimately discriminate against a group solely because his employees,
customers, or clients did).
184. See Laurie Winer, The Industry Women on the Side, L.A. MAG., Sept. 2002,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1346/is_9_45/ai_65091736
(reporting that the male partner of Endeavor Talent Agency described the company’s
ethos as “we fight and fuck”). Hollywood executives and producers do not hire
women, do not see it as a problem, and never will. Id. For example, one producer
said, “Women on film? Either naked or dead. Both are better.” Id.
185. See Grossman, supra note 153 (arguing that permitting traditionally male
environments that are hostile to women to remain in that state frustrates the goals of
anti-discrimination law because it prevents the workplace from equally welcoming
men and women).
186. See Writers Guild of America, 2005 Hollywood Writers Report, at 46, available
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entitled to assert the creative necessity defense, a more lenient sexual
harassment standard, women could be deterred from joining the
industry.187 Furthermore, the effects of the creative necessity defense
will have ramifications for consumers.188 The television shows that
Hollywood produces reflect the sexism that plagued the “Friends”
writers’ room, as evidenced by the violent male aesthetic that
dominates last season’s new television programs.189 By maintaining
the status quo in the writers’ room, the creative necessity defense will
encourage production studios to continue telling stories from the
narrow perspective of white, middle-class males.
B. The Creative Necessity Defense Will Make it More Difficult for Lyle
to Assert a Successful Sexual Harassment Claim and Collect Damages
The creative necessity defense should not apply to Lyle’s claim
because it would establish a higher level of protection for employers
facing a hostile work environment claim, while making it more
difficult for the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of sexual
harassment.190 Although a reasonable trier of fact would recognize
that the defendants would legitimately engage in some sexual
conversations to write “Friends,” a creative necessity defense could
insulate all sexually-themed discussions or displays of pornography,
even when it is unrelated to job performance.191 This will unfairly
at http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=922 (finding that the top shows
for women staff writers were more likely to be dramas than comedies); Writers Guild
of America, Women’s Share of Employment 1998-2004, available at http://www.wga.
org/uploadedimages/who_we_are/womens_employment_share.jpg (calculating that
women currently comprise 27% of all television writers).
187. See Grossman, supra note 153 (arguing that giving writers carte blanche to do
anything no matter how offensive and degrading to women runs the risk of creating
an environment in which no woman would want to work); No ‘Friends’ In This
Lawsuit, CBS NEWS, Dec. 23, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004
/12/23/entertainment/printable662668.shtml (relating that on sitcoms dominated
by men, where the tone is often angry and anti-female, women have the choice to
suffer a “mean room” or leave).
188. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Smut’s Insidious Threat, L.A. TIMES, March 20,
2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/suncommentary/laop-discrimination20mar20,1,2183704.story?coll=la-headlinessuncomment&ctrack=1&cset=true (arguing that the single most powerful force in
undercutting sex equality at work remains the cultural sexualization of women by
major corporations and mainstream media infusing pornography into daily life).
189. See Lisa De Moraes, Female Characters Made to Suffer for Our ‘Art,’ WASH.
POST, Sept. 18, 2005, at N1 (commenting that men have fashioned a trend in
Hollywood to show women raped and murdered, tortured in chains while wearing a
dog collar, and impaled on the ceiling before bursting into flames).
190. Cf. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991) (stating that the business
necessity defense is more lenient for employers to prove, while the impact approach is
more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy).
191. See Timmons, supra note 47, at 1205 (recognizing that only in a very unusual
workplace, such as Playboy, could it be said that an employer legitimately utilized
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raise the standard for plaintiff employees in creative environments,
requiring Lyle to prove conduct that goes well beyond what is
considered objectively hostile in other environments.192
Furthermore, the creative necessity defense will allow employers to
avoid damages for creating and maintaining hostile work
environments.193 For Lyle, compensatory and punitive damages are
the only damages recoverable because she cannot point to a tangible
employment action directly caused by the harassment suffered. 194
Permitting Warner Brothers and the writers to raise the creative
necessity defense will allow the defendants to avoid damages for
hostile work environment sexual harassment by reframing Lyle’s
claim as one of disparate impact, not disparate treatment.195
Consequently, these circumstances would discourage employers from
enforcing federal and state sexual harassment policies in creative
workplaces because they know they could escape judicial scrutiny and
avoid damages.196 The creative necessity defense is not only
inconsistent with recovering damages under hostile work
environment claims, but it also undermines Congress’s intent of
deterring sexual harassment.197

sexual conversations or the display of pornography). But see Williams v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (1999) (stating that women working in a blue collar
profession do not deserve less protection from the law than women working in a
courthouse). The view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending on
the work environment should be rejected. Id.
192. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (contending that women employed in
professions where crude language is commonly used by male employees will have
more difficulty establishing a hostile work environment because this will mean that
the more hostile the environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more
difficult it will be to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive).
193. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (rejecting the idea that hostile work
environment claims should be equated with disparate impact claims because Oncale
precludes employers from positioning claims as impact based in sexual harassment
cases).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (2006) (providing that a plaintiff may seek
compensatory and punitive damages against an employer who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination, but these damages cannot be recovered from an employer
whose employment practice is unlawful because of disparate impact); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 65-69 (1991) (discussing the need for damages to compensate
victims of sexual harassment).
195. See White, supra note 85, at 739 (discussing why Congress amended Title VII
to provide a remedy for sexual harassment plaintiffs and explaining that they believed
such damages were necessary because hostile work environment victims had no
remedy for statutory violations because Title VII only permitted recovery for equitable
relief).
196. Cf. Howard Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A
Study in Section 1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 798-800 n.37 (noting that
damages ensure that the actor’s conduct will not escape judicial scrutiny).
197. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (finding that additional remedies are needed to deter unlawful harassment
and intentional discrimination in the workplace).
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C. The Supreme Court of California Must Abandon the Creative
Necessity Defense and Follow the Oncale Precedent
The Supreme Court of California should have addressed and
nullified the creative necessity defense because Oncale takes into
account whether the defendants’ communications are actually
necessary to writing an adult-oriented situation comedy.198 Applying
the Oncale social context standard, in theory, will lead the court to
treat factually similar cases the same way.199 Thus, following this legal
precedent will resolve the problems that arise from the creative
necessity defense’s vagueness and prevent the trier of fact from
reaching unpredictable decisions, such as allowing the defendants to
avoid liability and damages or punishing the defendants for words
that are ultimately edited from the final story line.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal’s creative necessity defense disregards the
federal and state statutory mandate to promote and enforce civil
rights because it will allow employers in creative industries to exclude
women and minorities from the workplace. Because existing law
already takes into consideration whether harassing conduct is
necessary for a business, drawing a line between “creative” and other
workplaces is not legally sound. Creative necessity cannot serve as a
legitimate legal defense to hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims because it undermines the current laws against
employment discrimination.

198. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)
(asserting that, with common sense, a judge or jury can determine if the alleged
harassment within the specific workplace context amounted to discrimination).
199. See Frank, supra note 101, at 497-99 (arguing that examination of workplace
culture increases uniformity in close cases because it clarifies the boundaries between
lawful and unlawful conduct).
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